Neuroimaging and competency to be executed after Panetti This question subsumes multiple sub-questions.
• Will defense counsel seek to introduce such testimony, and what, exactly, can we expect such testimony will say? • In cases involving indigent defendants, will Ake v. Oklahoma 13 be interpreted expansively or restrictively? 14 • Will prosecutors seek to introduce such testimony to rebut defendants' Panetti applications? • To what extent are judges more or less impervious to the "dazzle" or "Christmas tree effect" of such testimony than are jurors? 15 • How will such testimony be dealt with if there is a Daubert challenge? 16 • How will fact-finders deal with such testimony in cases where the evidence revealed by neuroimaging testimony does not comport with their (false) "ordinary common sense" view of "crazy" criminal defendants? 17 • How will the less well known aspect of Panetti (that which deals with the need for additional expert testimony) be treated in such cases? • What, actually, will neuroimagers do in such cases?
This article seeks to offer some preliminary answers to these questions. The first section briefly reviews attitudes that scholars have expressed about the use of neuroimaging in the courts in criminal cases. The second section briefly discusses the Panetti case. The third section seeks to answer the questions raised above. The fourth section offers some tentative conclusions.
In the final verse of Bob Dylan's masterpiece, My Back Pages, Dylan captures the ambivalence of absolute terms:
Yes, my guard stood hard when abstract threats Too noble to neglect Deceived me into thinking I had something to protect Good and bad, I define these terms Quite clear, no doubt, somehow Ah, but I was so much older then I'm younger than that now. The literature (and judicial opinions) about neuroimaging reflect precisely this ambivalence (that it is "quite clear" ... "somehow"). One aim of this article is to consider the implications of this ambivalence for the topic addressed here.
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NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
A review of the literature on neuroimaging, predictably, reveals a broad array of positions, promises and prophecies. Carter Snead argues that the ambition of cognitive neuroscientists is "to use the claims of their discipline and the new powers conferred by neuroimaging to overthrow retributive justice as a legitimate justification for criminal sanctions." 20 Jonathan Marks quotes William Uttal's warning that neuroimaging may be simply a "neo-phrenological fad." 21 David Eagleman claims that "There is a new potential to use detailed combinations of behavioral tests and neuroimaging to better predict recidivism." 22 Steven Erickson argues that "it is inescapable that the novel and powerful technology of brain imaging drives [neuroscientists'] conception of the mind. "
23 Perhaps most emphatically, Bruce Arrigo charges that "the mass marketing and wholesale circulation of fMRI technology sustains the very structural inequalities (both social and psychological) that result in destructiveness, violence and crime. "
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This article consciously sidesteps this philosophical debate 25 and focuses instead on a related, but distinctly separate issue: what impact, in terms of case outcomes, will this evidence have on a small, but powerfully important and vivid, subset of cases-whether defendants sentenced to death are competent to be executed? 26 When jurors construe neuroimaging evidence in insanity defense cases 27 their response is likely highly ambivalent: balancing a positive response to the perceived characteristics of this evidence-vivid, objective, quantifiable, advanced 28 -with a negative response to the use of this evidence in such cases (reflecting their prejudice, 19 The questions I raise in this article clearly have implications far beyond the more narrow issue of neuroimaging testimony. I believe, however, that this specific focus is valuable in itself as it is a subtopic that will inevitably grow in significance in the coming years. 20 27 See generally, Perlin, supra note 4. This is another subset of criminal cases highly susceptible to the use and misuse of the vividness heuristic. See Perlin, supra note 17, at 4. The vividness heuristic is a cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made," and further accentuates a misperception of reality. See Perlin, supra note 3, at *24. 28 Perlin, supra note 4, at 890 ("this language jumps off the page"). hostility, and hatred toward insanity pleaders). 29 It is not certain that "the pizzazz of neuroimaging testimony-not withstanding its colorfulness and its propensity to reductionism-will trump these deep-seated attitudes." 30 The science of neuroscience, in short, has to be assessed in the sociopolitical context of the specific question oflaw that is central to the specific case before the court.
Neuroimaging is "fraught with uncertainties." 31 The steps used in the production and presentation of neuroimaging evidence are "not only not standardized, they are easily manipulated by a person with the knowledge of the technology." 32 37 See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 23, at 29 ("The impact of neuroscience on the law in the coming years will be inevitable, dramatic, and will fundamentally alter the way the law does business") (emphasis added). 38 sanity "as a lawful predicate to execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding,'' 40 a standard particularly demanding in light of the reality that "the present state of the mental sciences is at best a hazardous guess however conscientious."
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Ford has been interpreted narrowly, the lower courts regularly finding that competency was to be determined solely by an inquiry into whether a prisoner is aware "'that he [is] going to be executed and why he [is] going to be executed.'
42 Certiorari was granted in the Panetti case-at least in part-to clarify the Ford ruling.
Panetti, who had been convicted of capital murder in the slayings of his estranged wife's parents, had been hospitalized numerous times for serious psychiatric disorders. 43 Notwithstanding his "bizarre,'' scary", and "trance-like" behavior, he was found competent to stand trial and competent to waive counsel. 44 He was convicted (the jury rejecting his insanity defense), and was sentenced to death. 45 After his direct appeals and initial petition of habeas corpus were rejected, 46 Panetti filed a subsequent habeas writ petition, alleging that he did not understand the reasons for his pending execution.
47 This petition was rejected, the court concluding that the test for competency to be executed "requires the petitioner know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution. " 48 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, 49 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
50
The court reversed in a 5-4 decision, and in the course of its opinion 51 significantly elaborated on its Ford opinion in two dimensions: as to the procedures that are to be afforded to a defendant seeking to assert a Ford claim, and as to the substance of the Ford standard. 40 Id. at 411-12. 41 Solesbee, 339 U.S. 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("there are many forms of mental illness that are not understood"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous"). 42 Panetti, 448 F.3d, at 819; see also id. at 818 (discussing Ford, 477 U.S., at 421-422 (Powell,}., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 43 On the first matter, it found error below in the trial court's failure to provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed experts, 52 thus depriving him of his "constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard." 53 The fact-finding procedures on which the trial court relied, it concluded, were '"not adequate for reaching reasonably correct results' or, at a minimum, resulted in a process that appeared to be 'seriously inadequate for the ascertainment of the truth."'
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On the second, it carefully elaborated on-and clarified-Ford. It reviewed the testimony that demonstrated the defendant's "fixed delusion" system, 55 and quoted with approval expert testimony that had pointed out that "an unmedicated individual suffering from schizophrenia can 'at times' hold an ordinary conversation and that 'it depends [whether the discussion concerns the individual's] fixed delusional system."' 56 Here, it rejected the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Ford standard-that competency to be executed depends only on three findings: that the prisoner is aware he committed the murders, that he is aware that he is going to be executed, and that he is aware of the reasons the State has given for his execution.
57
This narrow test, the Supreme Court concluded, unconstitutionally foreclosed the defendant from establishing incompetency by the means that Panetti sought to employ in the case at bar: by making a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution." 58 The Fifth Circuit had squarely confronted this issue, and had found that "awareness" was "not necessarily synonymous with 'rational understanding"'; 59 the Supreme Court rejected this position, finding that it was "too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the Eighth Amendment. "
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In this case, the court found, the Fifth Circuit improperly treated a prisoner's delusional belief system "as irrelevant if the prisoner knows that the State has identified his crimes as the reason for his execution." 61 Nowhere, the court continued, did Ford indicate that "delusions are irrelevant to 'comprehen[sion]' or 'aware [ness]' if they so impair the prisoner's concept of reality that he cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution."
62 If anything, the court continued, "the Ford majority suggests the opposite. " 63 52 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2857. 53 Id. at 2858. 54 Id. at 2859, quoting, in part, Ford, 477 U.S., at 423-24 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 55 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2859. See id:
Four expert witnesses testified on petitioner's behalf in the District Court proceedings. One explained that petitioner's mental problems are indicative of"schizo-affective disorder," resulting in a "genuine delusion" involving his understanding of the reason for his execution. According to the expert, this delusion has recast petitioner's execution as "part of spiritual warfare ... between the demons and the forces of the darkness and God and the angels and the forces oflight." As a result, the expert explained, although petitioner claims to understand "that the state is saying that [ 1i' jl!i
After quoting the "simply offends humanity" language from Ford, 64 the court focused on the reasons why executing an insane person "serves no retributive purpose": 65 [I]t might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed. The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and the objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole. This problem is not necessarily overcome once the test set forth by the Court of Appeals is met. And under a similar logic the other rationales set forth by Ford fail to align with the distinctions drawn by the Court of Appeals. 66 There was no support in Ford ("or anywhere else"), the court added, for the proposition that "a prisoner is automatically foreclosed from demonstrating incompetency once a court has found he can identify the stated reason for his execution."
67 Although it conceded that concepts such as "rational understanding" could be difficult to define, and that some might fail to be punished on account of "reasons other those stemming from a severe mental illness," it concluded, on this point, "The beginning of doubt about competence in a case like petitioner's is not a misanthropic personality or an amoral character. It is a psychotic disorder."
68 In this case, it again underlined, it was the prisoner's "severe, documented mental illness that is the source of gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced." 69 After coming to this conclusion, the court added that it was not attempting to set out a rule to govern all competency determinations, and then remanded so that the "underpinnings of petitioner's claims [could] be explained and evaluated in further detail on remand. " 70 Among the questions it sought to be explored in greater depth was "the extent to which severe delusions may render a subject's perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed incompetent," citing here an aspect of the amicus brief by the American Psychological Association that had discussed ways in which mental health experts can inform competency determinations. 71 Panetti will be an enormously significant opinion with regard to the underlying issues for at least two reasons: it fleshes out the constitutionally adequate procedural standards for making a determination on execution competency (by demanding that defendants have the opportunity to submit adequate expert evidence to respond to evidence on competency "solicited by the state court" as part of the defendant's "constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard"), 72 that the prisoner possess a "rational understanding" 73 of the reasons he is to be executed.
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The court's opinion also expands the role of the expert witness in competency determinations. First, its procedural prong tells us that the trial court's failure to allow the defendant to introduce evidence on this question was a failure of constitutional dimensions. Second, its conclusion's citation to the American Psychological Association's amicus brief (that had discussed the ways that experts can inform competency determinations) tells us that a majority of this court (albeit a bare majority) is comfortable with (and responsive to) a greater role for mental health experts in judicial proceedings. We cannot underestimate the significance of this attitude.
Post Although the court finds that Ream's counsel, through the exercise of due diligence and reasonable competence, could have concluded earlier than he did that evidence ofHeam's neuropsychological deficits and fetal alcohol syndrome might satisfy the "significant limitations in intellectual functioning" element of the mental retardation definition, and that his counsel could have secured supporting expert testimony before responding to the state's summary judgment motion, this factor is outweighed by the importance of the new evidence and the fact that the state is unlikely to suffer unfair prejudice as a result of granting the requested relief. ,.... ------------------------------------- 
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER
This all leads to an examination of the questions listed above: How will neuroimaging testimony be dealt with in post-Panetti death penalty cases? This issue has not yet been resolved in any reported case, but it is inevitable that the issue will be confronted by the courts in the near future. Consider the following issues.
Will defense counsel seek to introduce such testimony, and what, exactly, can we expect such testimony will say?
My answer here is a qualified "maybe,'' dependent on multiple interlocked variables:
• Will courts be receptive to neuroimaging testimony that seeks to answer the specific substantive question posed by Panetti: did the defendant possess "a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution"? 79 Such testimony has been introduced-with mixed results-in cases where defendants have sought to assert their incompetency to stand trial or their lack of responsibility for the underlying criminal offense. 80 The two most notorious cases in this cohort are the cases of Vincent "The Chin" Gigante and John Hinckley, 81 but such evidence has also been introduced in a range of less familiar cases dealing with such questions as potential reduction in degrees of homicide, 82 the capacity of a defendant to plead guilty, 83 and the penalty phase of a death penalty trial. 84 How will courts react when the question is whether the defendant is even eligible for the death penalty?
• Will defense counsel even think about this question? This returns us to the question of the inevitability of substandard quality of counsel often made available to defendants in death penalty cases. 85 All too often, such lawyers are, in Judge Bazelon's unforgettable phrase, "walking violations of the Sixth Amendment. " 86 Is it too much to hope for to expect counsel to "get" the potential value of such testimony in Panettitype cases?
• Assuming counsel doesn't "get it," how will the courts construe the "pallid" 87 standard of Strickland v. Washington in this context? Is it likely that counsel will be held ineffective 88 for not seeking this sort of testing? 89 Or, if it is used, for not understanding its limitations? 90 An interesting parallel can be found in an investigation by Professor Deborah Denno of the use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. 91 Although Professor Denno discusses a handful of cases in which failure to consider such evidence resulted in Strickland-based remands, these cases, she concludes, are a "minority, and courts generally "place. . . less importance on [this] evidence. " 92 Will courts assessing this issue respond in the same way that the courts studied by Professor Denno responded?
• Assuming that counsel does get it, who pays? Neuroimaging testing is expensive, and is more expensive in cases in which the examined defendant is incarcerated when the test is performed. 93 Services of experts skilled to testify about this testing are also expensive. At a time at which the problem of funding indigent criminal defense has reached crisis proportions, 94 it is not hard to speculate as to likely trial responses to applications for independent neuroimaging tests.
In cases involving indigent defendants, will Ake v. Oklahoma 95 be interpreted expansively or restrictively? 96
In Ake v. Oklahoma, a death penalty case, the Supreme Court ruled that an indigent criminal defendant who makes a threshold showing that insanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial is constitutionally entitled fu a psychiatrist's assistance. Scholars have expressed concern that many of the claims made in support of some uses of neuroscience testimony in couljfs are "wholly unsupportable." 123 Courts have been mixed in their assessment of neroscience evidence under both Frye and Daubert. In at least three instances, Frye jurisdictions have rejected PET scan and SPECT scan evidence, in all cases finding that the evidence in question was not "generally accepted." 124 In other Daubert cases, though, such evidence has been accepted, albeit in matters involving civil causes of actions. 125 For the purposes of this article, one of the most intriguing (albeit cryptical) cases is that of Hoskins v. State. 126 There, in a death penalty case, the state Supreme Court vacated the sentence, noting, Following the PET-scan and the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge concluded that the PET-scan did show an abnormality and that, as conceded by the State, Dr. Krop's testimony changed as a result of the PET-scan. Because the trial judge has found in the affirmative, we vacate the sentence of death imposed on Hoskins and remand this cause for a new penalty phase proceeding. 127 In a footnote, the court noted that no Frye hearing was held, but added that "The fact that the trial judge did not consider these issues at the evidentiary hearing does not affect our decision to remand this case." 128 What is most critical here is the fundamental unfairness of the Daubert process:
It is obligatory to note the disparity in decisionmaking; that is, that, in Daubert cases, the prosecutor's position is sustained (either in support of questioned expertise or in opposition to it) vastly more often than is that of defense counsel's. 129 The implications of these findings must be considered as weli.
evidence by both judges and jurors, the distortions inherent in the evidence's "Christmas tree effect," and the "stacked deck" Daubert issue. If this aspect of Panetti is ignored, then it appears that the problems alluded to here will only be exacerbated.
In the remand opinion in Panetti, after hearing testimony by expert witnesses, jail guards, other inmates, and jail employees, the trial court found that, notwithstanding Panetti's well-documented and severe mental illness, he did understand the nature of the punishment he would be receiving, and thus was competent to be executed. 144 This decision was stayed pending appeal, 145 and as of the time of the submission of this article, there has been no subsequent decision. It is thus not clear at all as to how, on the facts of the case, this will eventually be resolved.
8. What, actually, will neuroimagers do in such cases?
The technology in question seeks to identify brain abnormalities in individuals with serious mental disabilities. 146 The examining neuropsychologist must review available historical information from the defendant's life history that might potentially point to possible brain impairment (e.g., documented head injuries or other neurological disease processes), or psychiatric disorders that indicate potential chemical and neurotransmitter abnormalities. 147 Best practices dictate that neuropsychological testing should be employed to to further clarify any neurobehavioral deficits and to pinpoint functional deficits that correlate with behavioral issues related to both the crime and the proposed neuroimaging study. 148 Whether structural (CT, MRI) or functional (PET, SPECT) approaches are employed will depend on the defendant's mental and neurological history. 149 Standard protocols typically used would include ensuring an awareness and appreciation of the procedure, potential risks and benefits from the procedure, and the ability to make a decision regarding these issues.
In the case of a defendant alleging incompetency to be executed, this all will be far more challenging. It is an issue that has not been addressed in either the caselaw or the academic literature, 150 but it is one that inevitably will need to be resolved in the aftermath of Panetti.
CONCLUSION
There has been an explosion of commentary and academic literature in recent years about the impact of neuroimaging testimony on the criminal trial process. Yet, there has never been any prior consideration of the relationship between this issue and the standards for determining competency to be executed as set out in the Panetti case. The issues raised in this article cover a fairly wide range of questions-questions of counsel behavior, juror attitudes, and evidentiary considerations-that, when looked at together, reflect so many of the tensions and ambivalences that are inherent in criminal trials, especially those of death-eligible defendants. 151 Panetti builds on, clarifies and expands the Ford standard by adding the requirement that the defendant possess a "rational understanding" of the purposes of the forthcoming execution, 152 but it also enhances the role of expert witnesses at competency-to-be-executed hearings. 153 As more and more attention is paid to the role of neuroimaging in the courts, it is inevitable that this testimony will be used (or at least, sought to be used) at such hearings, both by defendants and by prosecutors. We are still faced with the unanswered questions of how judges and jurors will assess such testimony.
The Ford test has, all too often, been no test at all. 154 Professor Richard Bonnie refers to the "appalling failures" of the criminal justice system that are "amply documented" by Panetti. 155 In its Panetti decision, the court stressed that, in a case in which a prisoner's mental state "is so distorted by a mental illness" that he does not share with "the community as a whole" an understanding of the concepts of crime and punishment, the objective "of community vindication [is] called in question. " 156 For years, scholars have been tentatively exploring the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence 157 and its implications for the execution of persons with severe mental disabilities. 158 Here, the court frontally considers the implications of this dilemma. But it does not-as it was not before it in the Panetti case-consider how neuroscience evidence might be used (or misused) in seeking to resolve these difficult questions.
We are just scratching the surface of the world of neuroscience. The evidence in question is powerful, and may inappropriately affect jurors-and judges-in their decisionmaking in ways that lead "to outcomes that are both factually and legally inaccurate and constitutionally flawed." 159 Self-evidently, in cases involving the death penalty, the risk of error is most troubling and, potentially, the least reversible.
